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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the other-condemning anger emotion which 
is a social type of anger triggered by the behaviour of other agents. 
Other-condemning anger responds to frustration of committed goals 
by others, and motivates goal-congruent behavior towards the 
blame-worthy agents. Understanding this type of anger is crucial for 
modelling human behavior in social settings as well as design-ing 
socially aware artificial systems. We summarize some exist-ing 
psychological theories on other-condemning anger and advo-cate 
building logical frameworks to formally specify this emotion. We 
believe that a formalization should provide a precise conceptu-
alization and characterization of other-condemning anger in terms 
of social and cognitive concepts such as beliefs, goals, intentions, 
controllability, accountability, and blameworthiness.
1. INTRODUCTION
Other-condemning anger is a reaction to the frustration of goals 
to which agents are committed, and motivates goal-congruent be-
havior towards the agents believed to be accountable for the goal 
frustration [3, 10, 7, 5]. Imagine a situation where autonomous 
robots commit themselves to transport containers from one place to 
another in some physical environment such as harbours or stock-
rooms. A robot R1 that aims at picking up its container at a des-
ignated position may notice the container is removed by another 
robot R2. A desirable response of the robot R1 would be to send a 
request to the robot R2, who is believed by R1 to be accountable for 
the removal of the container, to make the container accessible to R1 
and/or to send a warning message to the manager of the envi-
ronment to report this irregularity. We would like to emphasize that 
it is the general function of anger, i.e., specific type of response to 
specific type of situation, that we aim at integrating in the model of 
autonomous agents, rather than the physiological aspects of anger 
that is characteristic to the human body. For autonomous software 
agents that interact in social settings, the other-condemning anger 
emotion can be considered as a behavioural pattern or a heuristic 
that steers their behaviours.
Although there have been many efforts in artificial intelligence to
provide a precise specification of emotions in general [2, 8, 9, 14],
there has not been, to our knowledge, a precise and adequate spec-
ification dedicated to the other-condemning anger emotion based
on complex social constructs such as controllability, accountabil-
ity and blameworthiness. These social concepts require an ade-
quate formalization of notions such as actions, control, causality,
and their relations with the agents’ cognitive states. As the above
robot example illustrates, the angry robot R1 believes that its trans-
portation goal is frustrated and that this is due to the removal action
of robot R2 who had control over its removal action (in the sense
that R2 could have chosen not to remove the container) and who
is accountable for the caused consequences (R1 cannot accomplish
its transportation goal). The overtly social nature (being concerned
with other agents) of this type of anger emotion and its potential
to influence others’ behavior, make them essential for modelling
human-like social interaction and designing socially aware artifi-
cial systems, which can be used for example in entertainment and
serious games, crowd simulations, and human-computer interac-
tion.
2. MODELLING OTHER-CONDEMNING
ANGER
In order to model other-condemning emotions, we propose to
use a logical framework of multi-agent systems in which agents
are specified by means of their knowledge, beliefs, desires, inten-
tions, and actions. More specifically, we propose to use a tractable
multi-agent extension of the DL-GA logic (dynamic logic of graded
mental attitudes) developed by Dastani & Lorini in [2]. This model
allows us to formally specify the appraisal and coping processes
involved in other-condemning anger, thus providing a precise con-
ceptualization of the other-condemning anger emotion and its logic.
The logic supports reasoning about agents’ knowledge, graded be-
liefs, graded desires and intentions as well as agents’ future and
past actions. One of its feature is that actions are modeled as propo-
sitional assignments whose effect is to toggle the truth values of
atomic propositions.
We distinguish two types of anger emotions. The first type of
anger, called plain anger, involves two agents and captures the set-
ting where an agent’s committed goals are frustrated by another
agent. The second type of anger, called social anger, involves
three agents and captures the situation where the first agent gets
angry at the second agent because the second agent harms a third
agent who is in some social relation with the first agent. For social
anger, we assume some social rules the existence of which are due
to (or depend on) some norms or organisation that governing the
multi-agent environment. These assumed social rules may relate
the goals of the first and the third agents such that the frustration
of the third agent’s goals by the second agent indirectly frustrates
the goals of the first agent. For example, consider an extension of
the robot example with a new manager agent that is responsible for
the distribution and accomplishment of the transportation goals of
all transport robots, including robot R1. In this setting, the man-
ager agent and robot R1 are in an organisational setting where the
achievement of the transportation goals of R1 may contribute to the
achievement of the goals of the manager agent. If R2 frustrates the
goal of R1, then R2 will indirectly and through the existence of
the social rule frustrate the goal of the manager agent and therefore
make this agent angry.
The theoretic and empirical support for our modelling proposal
is derived from cognitive and social psychology, in particular the
emotion theories [3, 10, 7, 12, 13, 5]. Other-condemning anger is
commonly viewed as a negatively valenced reaction to the actions
of other agents [10]. It is an instance of the other-condemning emo-
tions [5], and triggered by frustration of a goal commitment [10, 7].
In our robot example, the goal that the transport robot is commit-
ted to, i.e., the goal to have the container at its designated posi-
tion, is frustrated. This broad view of other-condemning anger has
been refined by emotion theories to distinguish it from other nega-
tive emotions such as sadness, guilt and remorse that also can arise
from goal incongruence.
Most emotion theories distinguish other-condemning anger from
other negative emotions by attributing blame for goal incongru-
ence to other agents [7, 3]. As a result, blame towards someone
else becomes a necessary condition for other-condemning anger,
for without the attribution of blame we can expect an emotion such
as sadness. What does it mean, however, to blame someone for
goal incongruence? According to [7], blame is an appraisal based
on accountability and imputed control. To attribute accountabil-
ity is to know who caused the relevant goal-frustrating event, and
to attribute control is to believe that the accountable agent could
have acted differently without causing the goal-incongruence. In
our example, robot R1 believes that robot R2 is accountable for
removing the container and that R2 has the choice not to remove
the container. According to Lazarus, anger is triggered if, in ad-
dition to above conditions, the coping potential (the evaluation of
the possible responses) is viable. The prototypical coping strat-
egy of other-condemning anger generally involves attack, or other
means of getting back at the blameworthy agent, with the intention
of restoring a goal-congruent state of affairs [6, 3, 7]. In our run-
ning example, the robot R1 can send a request to R2 to make the
container accessible to R1 and/or to report this irregularity to the
environment manager.
The second type of anger, i.e., social anger, is similar to what is
often called moral anger, where a first agent is morally angry at a
second agent because the second agent harms a third agent by vio-
lating some moral norm (for a review on the literature from social
psychology see [16]; for a more philosophical treatment see [11]).
In such cases, an agent can rightfully be angry without any of his
own goals being directly frustrated. In our extended example, the
manager agent, which may be a software agent as well, may get
angry at robot R2, because R2 has frustrated the goal of R1. The
actual reason for an agent to get angry at the third agent is the exis-
tence of a social rule that prescribes and promotes cooperation. For
example, in case of human agents the reason for being angry can
be the violation of a moral rule that prescribes agents not to harm
the autonomy of each other. As argued in [12], autonomy is seen
as a right (i.e., a moral norm) pertaining to harm against persons.
The typical coping strategy for social anger is similar to the coping
strategy for the plain anger and promotes socially-congruent be-
havior. Combining this aspect of social anger with the elicitation
conditions of plain anger allows us to informally describe other-
condemning anger in psychological terms as follows: Displeasure
from thwarting of a personal goal, or a social rule aimed at pre-
serving the goal commitment of other agents, combined with at-
tribution of blame for the goal-thwarting state of affairs to another
agent, and an estimate of one’s own coping potential as favouring
attack towards the blameworthy agent.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the focus of our work is other-condemning anger, we
believe that a logical framework could be used to model various
other-condemning social emotions such as disgust and contempt.
The characteristic features of the other-condemning emotions are
its multi-agent flavor and the inclusion of emotion intensity. Al-
though the importance of emotion intensity has been stressed by
appraisal theorist, most of the formal models in the literature have
ignored at least one of them. For example, [1, 9, 15] ignores emo-
tion intensity and [2] does not have multi-agent flavor. Although
our proposal is inspired by [2], we believe the model should be
modified significantly in order to accommodate the characteristic
feature of other-condemning emotions. In particular, we believe
other-condemning and socially oriented anger requires extending
the single agent framework proposed in [2] to a multi-agent frame-
work. Moreover, the framework needs to be extended with the
converse of physical actions to reason about the state of the world
before the execution of an action. Such feature is of crucial impor-
tance to some components of anger, e.g., responsibility and blame.
Another influencing work on the topic has been the work of Ste-
unebrink, Dastani and Meyer [14]. Unlike our proposal, [14] takes
emotion intensity as primitive, without explaining how it depends
on belief and goal strengths. Furthermore, we believe that the de-
veloped logical framework should be rigorously specified and ana-
lyzed. The work presented in [14] does not provide any decidabil-
ity results or axiomatization, which is required to investigate the
decidability of the logical framework. Finally, [4] propose a for-
mal model of emotions which incorporates both emotion intensi-
ties and coping. However, the authors do not provide any details on
the underlying logic, which makes comparing the two approaches
difficult.
The contribution of our proposal should be viewed as twofold.
First, it advocates a precise conceptualization and characterization
of other-condemning social anger and its integration in a cogni-
tive model of agency. Second, it advocates formal understanding
of human-like social behavior which should pave the way towards
designing socially aware software systems. We intend to extend
the set of other-condemning emotions in future work and provide
an analysis on the relation between various social and moral emo-
tions. We believe that the dynamic nature of any logic of other-
condemning emotions should be powerful enough to allow com-
plex actions such that the accountability notion can involve actions
that have been performed in some state in the past.
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